Dr.Rao VBJ Chelikani
The futility of vying to be a 'big power' is warned by the outgoing United Nations SecretaryGeneral António Guterres, in an interview with The Hindu on the sidelines of the 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi in September 2026. He observed that while global power relations are deeply distorted, superpowers refuse to recognise the inherent limits of their might. By issuing such a statement in India, he advises India not to imitate them. At the opening of the 81st General Assembly of the United Nations, some countries, including the European Union, Brazil, Kenya, Canada, Australia and Barbados, which came together already at the World Economic Forum in Davos on January 26 as 'Middle Powers', did not involve, consult and include India initially, as far as we understand. But India joined later and endorsed the ― 'non-superpowers' group as an additional co-sponsor from the Global South. They are making a pitch as ― "Partners for Multilateralism" (P4M) with the United Nations, and not outside as many 'wanting-to-be Big-Powers' would like to behave violently either unilaterally or through Blocs and Groups. This category of states includes those that continue to vie aggressively to be part of the privileged few on the Security Council with veto Power. The P4M group pointed out that 2025 saw the highest recorded number of state-based armed conflicts since 1946 in 35 countries and the highest recorded military spending of nearly $3 trillion! Compounding this is the total absence of a robust global mechanism to penalise violations of international law. This institutional paralysis due to ignoring the UN system is evident in modern conflicts: Russia has failed to decisively defeat Ukraine despite years of sustained effort; the United States has been unable to bend Iran to its will despite deploying its formidable military apparatus, and a minor tribe of Houthis can defy international maritime laws and attack Saudi Arabia, one of the richest countries in the world.
History has repeatedly demonstrated these limitations of military might; both Vietnam and Afghanistan remained undefeated by the two superpowers, the US and Russia. Kim Jong-Un of North Korea, in conflict with South Korea, a neighbor has been testing for years inter-continental ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. Ultimately, regardless of advanced weaponry or the arrogance of ambitious politicians, the unyielding will of the people indoctrinated by the local leaders, in spite of much direct suffering, does not surrender. Nuclear weapons, at the end of all counts, remain unusable unless a state is prepared for mutual auto-destruction, a scenario in which there are no winners.
I. The bilateral relations in South Asia remain highly sensitive, fraught with suspicion, and an absence of meaningful cooperation. These dynamics are governed almost entirely by historical grievances, presenting a sharp contrast to the progress made in regional cohesion in South-East Asia or in Western Europe. Rather than acting as an encouraging elder brother, India has frequently mirrored the domineering dynamics of a traditional 'regional' power. This approach fosters zero-sum games where diplomatic negotiations routinely stall over issues of status, sovereignty, and regional hierarchy. Consequently, smaller neighbouring states frequently report feeling excluded from regional decision-making, attributing their marginalisation to New Delhi's rigid and highhanded diplomacy. This friction is tangible: Nepal, Bangladesh and Pakistan have expressed deep frustration over India‘s unilateral management of transboundary water resources, while Sri Lanka has raised serious concerns regarding India‘s assertive maritime policies. While differences between nations are inevitable, projecting diplomatic rigidity and bypassing meaningful consultation only creates a dangerous Achilles‘ heel—a structural weakness that prevents India from achieving true stability or invincibility in regional and global relations. In reality, stark geopolitical realities dictate limits; a vast country like China cannot stably occupy and rule India, just as Pakistan cannot realistically seize and maintain Indian territory through military force.
An analysis of India‘s major territorial border disputes with China, Pakistan, and Nepal and minor border disputes with neighbours like Myanmar, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka indicates that the Ministry of External Affairs has not done all that they could do to clear the impasse. The geopolitical realities keep them unresolved primarily because they are deeply tied to national identity and strategic military advantages.
1. It is true that when the British Empire withdrew from the subcontinent, it drew a hurried, poorly surveyed, or deliberately ambiguous boundary plan, particularly the McMahon Line drawn in 1914 between British India and Tibet, which was never officially accepted by the mainland government of China, for whom Aksai Chin is vital because it connects Xinjiang and Tibet and shares Himalayan waters of the Indus and Brahmaputra. What started as simple boundary disagreements has evolved into a larger struggle for dominance in Asia, using the border as a tool for geopolitical leverage. China uses it to keep India strategically off-balance and distracted from expanding its influence into the broader Indian Ocean. India, in turn, refuses to decouple border peace from its wider economic and diplomatic relationships with Beijing.
2. The Radcliffe & Mountbatten Lines at the time of partition in 1947 and the dispute between Pakistan and India over the accession of the state of Jammu and Kashmir remain unresolved. The military establishment of Pakistan provides the primary rationale for maintaining an outsized military build-up. While the initial Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) of 1960 is celebrated as a rare success of bilateral and multilateral negotiation, subsequent disputes over hydro-engineering projects (like the Baglihar and Kishanganga dams) perfectly reflect a zero-sum mentality. A treaty signed before the World Bank is kept in abeyance unilaterally by India, apprehending some other moves by Pakistan or China. Diplomatic parleys are stalled now as neither side wants to appear as though they are conceding ground or accepting a "loss" to the other, transforming technical engineering issues into high stakes tests of political willpower.
3. In 1974, India ceded the small, uninhabited island of Kachchatheevu to Sri Lanka under a bilateral maritime boundary agreement to foster goodwill. However, the deal has remained a flashpoint in Indian domestic politics, particularly in Tamil Nadu, over fishing rights. Decades later, political rhetoric in India occasionally revisits the treaty, framing the concession as a historic blunder or a "loss" of sovereign territory. Sri Lanka, conversely, fiercely guards the treaty, viewing any attempt to reopen negotiations as an existential threat to its maritime sovereignty by a vastly larger power.
4. The 2015 India–Nepal Transit Dispute and the Indian economic blockade, which choked off essential supplies like fuel and medicine, show how a larger nation uses its geopolitical leverage to influence the domestic policy of a smaller, landlocked neighbour. Following the adoption of Nepal‘s new constitution in 2015, India expressed deep dissatisfaction regarding the political representation of the Madhesi community. Nepal viewed New Delhi's stance as an elitist, paternalistic attempt to dictate its internal laws. The diplomatic standoff severely strained bilateral relations and pushed Nepal closer to China to balance India's dominance.
5. The initial Land Boundary Agreement was signed in 1974 by Indira Gandhi and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman of Bangladesh, and the ratification was delayed by India for 41 years due to domestic political opposition and a rigid reluctance to give up territory. The delay highlighted how formalistic, elite-driven diplomacy can ignore human suffering on the ground to preserve abstract notions of state superiority. Though the dispute was resolved in 2015, Bangladesh wants to review it now under a new government. The Bangladeshi authorities in power widely believe that India's uncritical backing of Hasina's Awami League for over 15 years directly enabled her to suppress democratic freedoms and stage unfree elections. When Hasina fled to India, and after a special Bangladeshi tribunal sentenced her to death in absentia for crimes against humanity, India has refused to hand her over. Tensions are further strained by what Dhaka describes as an alarmist, "massive disinformation campaign" by Indian media regarding the treatment of minority Hindus in Bangladesh. The Prime Minister Tarique Rahman has heavily criticised past agreements made during Hasina's tenure, viewing them as heavily "favouring" India at the expense of Bangladesh's sovereign interests.
6. To complete the encirclement by countries that are not good neighbours, we might add the Maldives, which manage their shared maritime security through platforms like the Colombo Security Conclave, or more about the 1976 agreement. India monitors closely for regional security and its border disagreements with Mauritius over the Chagos Archipelago. Whose interests are being served by keeping these disputes unsettled for so long, as long as 80 years? During all these rounds of negotiations with China, concern was only about how to keep the conflicting borders stable; never about tracing the border, once and for all. Thus, the diplomatic negotiations between neighbouring states can become prolonged and intense when driven by zero-sum power struggles ("who is superior and who should accept to lose") rather than mutual compromise. Formalism, dry politeness, and a detached or "high-brow" attitude perceived of the Indian diplomatic corps might stem from British colonial traditions, contrasting with the modern, more informal approach adopted by British diplomats themselves today.
II. Bilateral diplomatic negotiations and formal legal mechanisms usually produce binary, win-lose outcomes. A piece of land is either legally awarded to Country A or Country B. Courts cannot offer the creative, political trade-offs needed to settle deep emotional disputes. For a political leader, accepting a court ruling that "gives away" ancestral or claimed territory to a historic rival is domestic political suicide. We have many non-formal mechanisms, or alternative dispute resolution (ADR) frameworks, such as Track II diplomacy, to de-escalate tensions and build consensus towards a permanent and speedy solution. These mechanisms are eminently suited to deal with neighbouring states and operate outside the rigid constraints of official government offices, allowing for candid, creative, and "deniable" conversations.
While this process involves official or semi-official figures, the mechanism itself is non-formal, highly secretive, and operates completely outside standard bureaucratic procedures. Formal diplomacy requires public statements, which are often hijacked by domestic political pressure and national pride. Non-formal mechanisms offer deniability, psychological safety, and confidentiality, allowing adversaries to test the waters of peace without looking weak to their citizens.
1. Multi-track diplomacy uses different sectors of society, like NRIs, political party leaders and other citizens in those countries who want friendly relations with India, to influence state authorities like ministers, diplomats and high bureaucracy and, above all, Parliament members.
2. Discussions led by retired diplomats, military generals, academics, and NGO think-tanks, who do not represent the government officially, can float radical, out-of-the-box solutions without political consequences.
3. Industrialists, businessmen, large corporations and trade bodies emphasise the financial loss of border disputes and lobby and often push for soft borders or joint economic zones, bypassing territorial stalemates.
4. Cultural exchanges, academic collaborations, and independent media reporters aimed at reducing "people-to-people" animosity and altering hyper-nationalist public perceptions.
5. Direct, secret communication between intelligence chiefs (e.g., India's RAW and Pakistan's ISI) to quietly manage crises or negotiate ceasefires without public scrutiny.
6. Heads of state appointing trusted, private individuals (like business tycoons or close personal confidants) to deliver direct messages to foreign leaders, bypassing the formal Ministry of External Affairs.
7. International bodies and friendly third-party nations can offer non-formal legal frameworks to help disputing nations find common ground: A neutral third party (often the UN Secretary-General or a neutral from Switzerland or Scandinavian or Baltic countries to act as a facilitator. They simply bring the disputing parties into the same room and provide a safe space to talk, without offering actual solutions.
8. A neutral third party takes an active role as Mediator or Reconciliator, investigating the dispute and proposing informal, non-binding compromise plans for both nations to consider.
9. Independent panels of experts like geographers, historians, and international lawyers are deployed as a Fact-Finding and Inquiry Mission to objectively map out the disputed facts or history, independent of the versions proposed by the parties in dispute and bereft of political emotions.
10. Sometimes, disputes are managed during Informal Multilateral Coalitions and Conferences by bringing the hostile nations into informal, club-like multilateral settings where the focus is not on the border, but on shared challenges. Forcing engagement through forums like the BRICS Summit, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), or regional climate change panels. Leaders can use the sidelines of these informal summits for unscripted "pull-apart" meetings to defuse border flare-ups. But China, in its presence in New Delhi in 2026 on the occasion of the BRICS Summit, does not seem to have yielded to that kind of pressure.
III. If the informal channels have not produced the expected results, we cannot keep the fire burning forever, as in the case of China and Pakistan disputes. The United Nations Organisation stresses and relies on structured, formal organisations and legal frameworks and facilitates the creation and enforcement of international law to maintain peace in case of hardened disputes among states. Unlike the non-formal mechanisms, these institutions produce legally binding judgments, formal arbitration awards, or structured state-level interventions. But they take a long time to close the matter. But governments often prefer a frozen, unresolved dispute (a status quo) over a formal legal resolution where they risk losing face, losing resources, or appearing weak to their citizens.
1. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is a formal, permanent court established by international treaties to adjudicate legal disputes between sovereign states. Based in The Hague, the ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. It settles legal disputes and contentious cases submitted by states. Broad international law, territorial & border lines and gives advisory opinions on legal questions. It can only hear a case if both states involved consent to its jurisdiction.
2. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) is based in Hamburg. ITLOS is a specialised court established under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). It specifically handles maritime disputes, such as sea boundaries, navigation rights, and marine resource exploration.
3. The International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutes individuals rather than resolving borders between states; it acts as an institutional mechanism to address state-sponsored atrocities, prosecuting war crimes, genocide, and the crime of aggression.
4. The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) allows states to resolve a dispute by submitting it to an ad hoc tribunal of neutral judges chosen by the parties themselves. Also located in The Hague, the PCA is not a traditional court but a permanent framework that helps states set up temporary arbitral tribunals. It is highly favoured for complex territorial, maritime boundary, and investment disputes and treaty disputes because the process is faster and more flexible than the ICJ. India v. Bangladesh (2014 maritime boundary dispute was settled via the PCA.
5. Ad-Hoc Arbitral Tribunals: States can mutually agree to set up a one-time independent panel under specific international treaties to settle a single dispute.
6. The UN Security Council (UNSC) is a Political and Security Mechanism under Chapter VI and Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It has the authority to intervene in disputes that threaten international peace. It can issue binding resolutions, mandating ceasefires, deploy UN peacekeeping troop missions, impose economic sanctions, or authorise collective military action.
7. When an aggrieved state makes a statement and other states also speak on the same subject, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) passes resolutions; they are generally non-binding recommendations, but it serves as a powerful forum for global diplomatic pressure. The UNGA can pass "Uniting for Peace" resolutions if the Security Council is deadlocked by a veto.
8. The disputes are not always about land; they might be about trade, finance, and resources. The WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the World Trade Organisation possesses a highly structured, multi-stage mechanism to resolve trade conflicts, tariff wars, market access and illegal subsidies between member states. It resolves many US-China or US-EU trade tariff disputes.
9. The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes ICSID is a part of the World Bank Group; it handles legal disputes specifically between foreign investors and host sovereign states.
IV. Despite the existence of the above highly structured bodies like the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the UN Security Council (UNSC), dozens of territorial and geopolitical conflicts remain frozen or active for decades. Why? They often fail because they operate in an anarchic international system where sovereign states hold the ultimate power, and international organisations possess no independent enforcement mechanism. In domestic law, if a court passes a judgment, the police enforce it. In international law, there is no global police force to compel a nation to comply. If a state loses a formal legal case and refuses to give up the land, the winning state has very little recourse other than going to war or imposing unilateral economic sanctions. In 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) ruled heavily against China‘s expansive maritime claims on the South China Sea in a case brought by the Philippines. Because the court has no army or enforcement arm, China simply called the ruling a "piece of waste paper" and ignored it completely.
The foundational rule of international law, unfortunately, is that sovereign states cannot be forced into court against their will. Even when countries sign treaties, they often include Reservations. For example, India, Pakistan, and China have historical declarations that explicitly prevent third-parties or courts or international arbitration from intervening in their bilateral territorial disputes. It is time to withdraw such Reservations which prevent any reconciliation.
When disputes escalate to the UN Security Council, which is the only body capable of enforcing international law through military action or global sanctions, the five permanent members (US, UK, France, Russia, China) have been exercising absolute veto power. Thus, if an international dispute involves a permanent member or one of their close allies, any punitive resolution is instantly vetoed.
The Permanent 5 (P5) members have exercised their veto power a total of approximately 295 times since the system was established in 1946:
Russia / USSR: 130+ times;
United States: 85+ times;
United Kingdom: 29 times;
China: 20+ times; and France: 16 times.
This explains why the UN has been unable to definitively resolve long-standing issues like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Russia-Ukraine war, or the Kashmir dispute.
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